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WHO PAYS ARBITRATION FEES?: THE UNANSWERED QUES-
TION IN CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. v. ADAMS
I. INTRODUCTION*
As courts and administrative agencies are becoming busier and
litigation more complex, many today see alternative dispute resolution,
specifically arbitration, as a way to promptly and efficiently resolve
disputes.' Arbitration, especially in light of the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,2 is becom-
ing more common in employer-employee, business-customer, and busi-
ness-business relationships. The Court held in Circuit City that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to nearly all interstate employ-
ment relationships. 3 The challenge before the courts now is determin-
ing who should bear the burden of paying for the arbitration of
disputes.
II. HiSTORIcAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LAW
A. Origins, Operative Provisions, and Purposes of the Federal
Arbitration Act
At common law, agreements to arbitrate were met with hostility
and generally held void as attempts to "oust" the courts from jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter.4 However, by the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, the United States Supreme Court started issuing opinions
supporting and encouraging arbitration as means of peaceful settle-
ment.5 In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
compelling judicial enforcement of written arbitration agreements:6
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professors Richard A. Lord and E.
Gregory Wallace for their helpful insight in regard to the issues discussed herein.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
2. 532 U.S. 105, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). The focus of this article is on arbitration
in the employer-employee setting.
3. Id.
4. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6 (Walter H.E. Jaeger
ed., The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1977) (1920); Hamilton v. Home Ins.
Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890).
5. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 28-30 (Walter H.E.
Jaeger ed., The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1977) (1920).
6. Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105. FAA was reenacted and codified in 1947 in Title 9
of the United States Code (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1999)).
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.7
The express purpose of the FAA was to "enforce [arbitration] agree-
ments into which parties had entered" and to "place such agreements
'upon the same footing as other contracts."' 8
Section 1 of the FAA contains an exception to the Act stating that:
"nothing [in this Act] shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce."9 Under the maxim, ejusdem generis,
this exception has been strictly construed by the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeal, save the Ninth
Circuit, to apply solely to transportation workers and those specifi-
cally engaged in interstate commerce.1 °
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
8. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
10. Ejusdem generis, meaning: "when a general word or phrase follows a list of
specific persons or things, the general words or phrase will be interpreted to include
only persons or things of the same type as those listed" (BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 535
(7th ed. 1999)). Circuit City, 535 U.S. 105, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001); see generally
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(applying FAA to Title VII claims); Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191
F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying FAA to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII
claims); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act are enforceable under the FAA); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc.,
238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001) (subjecting federal statutory claims, like those under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, to mandatory arbitration agreements); Alford
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII
claims are subject to securities industry compulsory arbitration); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that only those employment
contracts which specifically implicate interstate commerce are not subject to the FAA,
falling within the exclusion of "contracts of employment"); Baltimore & Ohio Chicago
Terminal R.R. Co. v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 154 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that "most,
perhaps all, statutory claims are arbitrable."); Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
177 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying FAA to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that Section I of the FAA "applies only to contracts of employment for those
classes of employees that are engaged directly in the movement of interstate
[Vol. 24:93
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Arbitration is a method of settling disputes by one or more unoffi-
cial persons, issuing a decision and an award in lieu of a judicial pro-
ceeding.11 The benefits of the enforcement of arbitration provisions
are numerous. An arbitration agreement permits the parties to avoid
the high costs of prolonged litigation, especially beneficial in employ-
ment situations where smaller sums of money are involved and diffi-
cult choice-of-law questions are presented. 12 Unfortunately, many
attorneys think of arbitration narrowly, applying only to employment
situations.' 3 One of the trade-offs for less costly dissolution of a case
is limited discovery procedures, for a party "trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality,
and expedition of arbitration." 4
Although many arbitrators appear to be acting as private judges,
arbitration does provide a form of mediation with a more informal
hearing, issuing a final and binding decision on the merits.15 Because
decisions are rendered upon the merits of a particular case and arbitra-
tors are subject to only very limited review by a court, arbitrators may
sometimes reach decisions and give relief that a trial court cannot
award. 16
Despite allegations that arbitration panels will be biased, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected such attacks:
"[w]e decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain
commerce"); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII claims are subject to mandatory arbitration);
McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that FAA's
"workers engaged in interstate commerce" exemption only applies to contracts of
employees actually engaged in interstate commerce); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that Title VII claims are subject to
securities industry compulsory arbitration); but see, e.g., Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,
161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1999), op. amended and superseded on denial of reh'g by 177
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
11. Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 190 (1910).
12. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
13. Judith A. La Manna, Mediation Can Help Parties Reach Faster, Less Costly Results
in Civil Litigation, 73 N.Y. St. B.J. 10 (2001).
14. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
15. See La Manna, supra note 13.
16. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); see
Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules), Rule 34 (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109. The most
common example is the award of punitive damages when they could not otherwise be
awarded.
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competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators." 17 Moreover, arbi-
tral rulings are reviewable by the courts and may be overturned
"[w]here there [is] evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."1 "
Often, unequal bargaining power will exist between an employee
and employer.' 9 However, the Supreme Court of the United States
observed that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power ... is not a suffi-
cient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforcea-
ble."' 20 Thus, an arbitration agreement is enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."'"
In North Carolina, a contract provision requiring that the parties
settle disputes by arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable
unless the parties agree to the contrary.22 Further, arbitration is
favored by public policy with any doubt concerning the existence of an
arbitration agreement resolved in favor of arbitration.23 However, arbi-
tration may only exist between employers and employees if the employ-
ment contract explicitly so provides.24
North Carolina, along with approximately 35 other states, has
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, which is similar to the Federal
Arbitration Act. 25 North Carolina's general provision regarding arbi-
tration is comparable to Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, read-
ing as follows:
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any
controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement, or they
may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by arbi-
tration of any controversy thereafter arising between them relating to
such contract or the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof. Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable, and
17. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 634.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1999).
19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (requiring
arbitration of claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act is enforceable
because arbitration provides an adequate alternative forum).
20. Id. at 33.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
22. Johnston Co. v. Rouse, 331 N.C. 88, 414 S.E.2d 30 (1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
567.2 (1999).
23. Johnston Co. v. Rouse, 331 N.C. 88, 414 S.E.2d 30 (1992).
24. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-567.2(b)(2) (1999).
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-567.1-.29 (1999); see, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §§ 12-1501 (2000) (providing table with statutory citations for jurisdictions
which have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act).
[Vol. 24:93
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irrevocable except with the consent of all the parties, without regard to
the justiciable character of the controversy. 2 6
The primary difference between the FAA and North Carolina's statute
is that the FAA solely governs contracts "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce. ' 27 Thus, whether an employment contract is gov-
erned by state or federal arbitration law makes no significant differ-
ence since the arbitration rules are basically the same and are applied
similarly.2 8
B. United States Supreme Court Decisions Upholding and Interpreting
the FAA
The constitutional validity of the FAA has been questioned in sev-
eral United States Supreme Court cases.29 The Court, in defending the
FAA, goes back to the origins of the United States Constitution to
establish the validity of the Act. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution empowers Congress "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes. '30 The United States Supreme Court has broadly defined "com-
merce" to encompass nearly all activity affecting two or more states by
including: "every species of commercial intercourse . . .which con-
cerns more States than one."'3 1 The Supreme Court further extended
congressional power to regulate any activity, local or interstate, that
either in itself or in combination with other activities has a "substan-
tial economic effect on" interstate commerce. 3 2 However, while Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce is broad, it is not without
boundaries. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Lopez that the
mere possibility that an activity might have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce was not sufficient to justify congressional regula-
tion; a jurisdictional nexus must exist between the activity regulated
and interstate commerce.3 3 Despite that proscription, the Supreme
Court preserved Congress' commerce authority to regulate those activ-
ities, including persons, having a substantial relation to interstate com-
26. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.2(a) (1999); see Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d
793 (1982).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
28. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.2(a) (1999); see Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d
793 (1982).
29. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); see
Southland, 465 U.S. 1; Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193-194 (1824).
32. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
33. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2001]
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merce even though involved in solely intrastate activities.3 4
Accordingly, the Court has found that the FAA is a proper exercise of
Congress' commerce clause power and thus is applicable to arbitration
provisions involving interstate activity, excluding employment con-
tracts of transportation workers.35
Despite this broad grant of power by the Supreme Court, attorneys
general of 22 states have argued that the FAA unreasonably intrudes
upon the policies of individual states by preempting state employment
laws which restrict or limit pre-dispute arbitration agreements between
employees and employers and preclude employees from contracting
away their right to pursue claims in court.36 However, in Southland
Corporation v. Keating, the United States Supreme Court held that
Congress intended the FAA to apply to individual states as well.37 The
FAA was "motivated, first and foremost, by a ... desire" to change state
antiarbitration policies by placing arbitration "agreements 'upon the
same footing as other contracts. ' ' 38 Thus, states are still afforded a
"method for protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree-
ment to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may
regulate ... arbitration clauses ... under general contract law princi-
ples and may ... invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" 39 Fur-
ther, the Court stated, by "agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial
forum.' "40 In the end, the Court found that the FAA preempted state
legislative attempts to undermine the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 4
Then in 1995, the United States Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson further defined the scope of the
FAA, holding that by enacting the FAA, Congress intended to exercise
extensive interstate commerce power.42 Section 2 of the FAA covers
contracts "involving commerce," a broader term than the traditionally
34. See id.
35. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
36. Id.
37. See Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
38. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220; Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 474.
39. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281. (1995).
40. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628) (Fourth
Circuit case of registered securities representative who brought suit against employer
alleging termination violated Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
41. See Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
42. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265.
[Vol. 24:93
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used words of "in commerce."43 The Supreme Court held that the
word "involving" was the functional equivalent of "affecting," indicat-
ing Congress' intent to fully exercise its constitutional power.44 Thus,
again, the Supreme Court dismissed an attack on the FAA, holding the
Act was a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power.45
The most recent Supreme Court case questioning the application
and scope of the FAA is Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.46 In that
case, the employer brought an action in federal court under the FAA to
compel arbitration and enjoin the employee's state court employment
discrimination action.47 The circuit court held that all employment
contracts were beyond the scope of the FAA's reach.48 The United
States Supreme Court summarily reversed, holding that the only con-
tracts that were exempted from the FAA were employment contracts of
transportation workers. 49  The Court recited the same commerce
clause discussion as in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies. ° Although
the Court resolved the issue of the scope and application of the FAA,
the Court did not indicate who would be responsible for all the fees
associated with arbitration. 5' The issue now before the federal courts,
and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, is the treatment of
fee-splitting provisions in arbitration agreements.5 2
IlI. TYPES OF ISSUES ARBITRATED IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE SETTING
Given the expansive application of the FAA by the United States
Supreme Court in Circuit City, many diverse issues can be subjected to
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999). See Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
44. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-274. The United States Supreme Court ruling in
United States. v. Lopez has no effect on the Court's interpretation of the FAA: "To say
that the statutory words 'engaged in commerce' are subject to variable interpretations
depending upon the date of adoption, even a date before the phrase became a term of
art, ignores the reason why the formulation became a term of art in the first place: The
plain meaning of the words 'engaged in commerce' is narrower than the more open-
ended formulations 'affecting commerce' and 'involving commerce.' [citation]. . .It
would be unwieldy for Congress, for the [Supreme] Court, and for litigants to be
required to deconstruct statutory Commerce Clause phrases depending upon the year
of a particular statutory enactment." Circuit City, 532 U.S. at -- , 121 S. Ct. at 1310.
45. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-274.
46. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-274.
51. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
52. This article will specifically deal with fee-splitting in the employer-employee
context.
2001]
7
Lamm: Who Pays Arbitration Fees? The Unanswered Question in Circuit Cit
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
arbitration in the employer and employee relationship, either through
compelled statutory arbitration or through contractual provisions.53
Restrictive covenants, statutory rights, wrongful termination, choice of
law, forum selection clauses, and anti-trust disputes are just some top-
ics that are commonly submitted by employment contracts to arbitra-
tion.5' This article will focus on the arbitration of restrictive
covenants, statutory rights, and wrongful termination in the employer-
employee setting.
A. Restrictive and Noncompetition Covenants
A restrictive covenant is a contractual provision found in employ-
ment contracts in which one party agrees to forego conducting busi-
ness similar to that of the other party.55 A majority of states uphold
noncompetition covenants if signed prior to, contemporaneously with,
or shortly after employment begins so long as the conditions are rea-
sonable in their scope, time, and geographical restrictions.56
Determining whether to apply state arbitration law (usually the
Uniform Arbitration Act) or the FAA to restrictive covenants is some-
times difficult. 57 However, when the contract terms do not specify
whether state or federal arbitral provisions are to apply, most courts
look to the scope of the geographical restrictions to determine if the
transaction involves interstate commerce.58 If the restrictive covenant
does in fact involve interstate commerce, then according to Circuit City,
the FAA applies to the dispute.5 9 If geographical restraints are solely
intrastate or are not imposed by the restrictive covenant, then state law
is applied, absent a choice of law clause in the employment contract.60
When a restrictive covenant involves intertwined facts and issues,
with some issues requiring arbitration and others not, jurisdictions
53. Walker v. S. Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1967) (stating that some claims are subject
to mandatory arbitration due to statute requirement); Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
54. Topics such as choice of law provisions, forum selection clauses, and anti-trust
disputes, are not discussed in this article due to their unique and complex nature.
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (7th ed. 1999).
56. Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 370 (7th ed. 1999).
57. Graphic Scanning Corp. v. Yampol, 850 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1988).
58. See id. (subjecting parties to federal arbitration law because restrictive covenant
limiting activities in three states clearly involved interstate commerce).
59. See id.; Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105 (employment contracts of transportation
workers are not subject to the FAA).
60. See Graphic Scanning, 850 F.2d 131.
[Vol. 24:93
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were split in their treatment of whether to deny or grant arbitration.61
However, in 1985, the United States Supreme Court clarified the issue,
holding that the FAA
divests the district courts of any discretion regarding arbitration in
cases containing both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, and instead
requires that the courts compel arbitration of arbitrable claims, when
asked to do so .... [Bloth through its plain meaning and the strong
federal policy it reflects, [the FAA] requires courts to enforce the bar-
gain of the parties to arbitrate, and "not substitute [its] own views of
economy and efficiency" for those of Congress.62
Hence, the FAA "requires district courts to compel arbitration of pen-
dent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to com-
pel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums. '"63
B. Statutory Rights under Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment dis-
crimination and harassment on the basis of an individual's race, color,
religion, sex, pregnancy, or national origin, and further prohibits retal-
iation against an employee who opposes illegal harassment or discrim-
ination in the workplace.6 4 In 1991, the United States Supreme Court
stated that statutory claims, specifically those under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA), may be subjected to the FAA since
nothing in the text or the legislative history explicitly precludes arbitra-
tion or other nonjudicial resolution of claims.65 Additionally, while
dicta, the Gilmer Court concluded that Title VII claims and those
under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act, which amended the
ADEA, were not excepted from the FAA either.6 6 According to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, "'[wlhere appropriate and to the extent authorized
by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, includ-
61. See Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (general principal of requiring arbitration is applicable
in other situations besides employer-employee restrictive covenants; however, for
simplicity sake, this article only discusses in restrictive covenant context). For a
comparison of state treatment of intertwined facts and issues, see, Atmel Corp. v.
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., No. 98CA0586, 2001 WL 125909, at *8-9 (Colo. Ct. App.
Feb. 15, 2001), holding that due to judicial economy, all issues should be resolved by
litigation.
62. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217 (quoting Dickinson v. Heinold Sec. , Inc., 661 F.2d 638,
646 (9th Cir. 1981)).
63. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
65. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
66. Id.; see Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.).
2001]
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ing . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under
[Title VII and the ADEA]."' 67 The majority of courts have interpreted
the phrase "to the extent authorized by law" to mean "current law,"
meaning current arbitration law. 6' Thus, both Gilmer and the FAA
apply to statutory claims.69
However, the employment contract must specify that statutory
claims are subject to arbitration.7 ° If the employment agreement only
requires the arbitration of contract-based claims, an employee is not
precluded from subsequently bringing statutory claims in a judicial
setting.7 1
One of the primary challenges to the enforceability of arbitration
provisions, specifically those affecting Title VII claims, is the issue of
unconscionability.72 Courts have held that requiring an employee to
sign an employment contract submitting claims to arbitration as a pre-
requisite to employment does not constitute an unconscionable con-
tract of adhesion.73  The burden of proof to establish
unconscionability requires a showing of "'both a lack of meaningful
choice about whether to accept the provision in question, and that the
dispute provisions were so onesided as to be oppressive.' ''74 Mere
gross disparity in bargaining power "is not a sufficient reason to hold
that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context. ' 75 The party alleging inequality of bargaining power must
show fraud or other oppressive conduct to invalidate the arbitral
provision.76
C. Wrongful Termination
Wrongful termination and discharge actions brought by a former
employee against an employer, allege that the termination of employ-
ment was illegal or violated a contract provision.77 The United States
Supreme Court has held that contract grievance procedures, especially
those relating to wrongful termination, are permissible so long as the
67. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 4 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991).
68. See Desiderio, 191 F.3d 198.
69. Id.
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 1.
73. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 1.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
76. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 17.
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (7th ed. 1999).
[Vol. 24:93
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provisions are "voluntarily incorporated by the parties. ' 78 However,
some employer-employee relationships implicate federal laws that
mandate arbitration of certain disputes.79 The Supreme Court held
that an employee is not required to pursue a remedy for wrongful ter-
mination under arbitration if the agreement was involuntarily entered,
even if statutorily mandated.8 °
Courts have addressed two primary issues concerning wrongful
termination claims: the first issue involves unilateral arbitration
requirements with the second pertaining to overly broad arbitration
provisions." First, many employment contracts compel the "arbitra-
tion of employee-but not employer-claims arising out of wrongful
termination. 82 The employer cannot require the employee to waive
rights to a jury trial and then retain all the "'benefits and protections
the right to a judicial forum provides"' the employer.83 The court
requires some "modicum of bilaterality. ''8 4 Accordingly, unilateral
obligations to arbitrate wrongful termination disputes are unconscion-
able.8 5 Second, in drafting clauses requiring arbitration of wrongful
discharge claims, an overly broad clause may encompass more causes
of action than the parties desire.86 For instance, an arbitration provi-
sion calling for resolution of disputes involving an employee's termina-
tion is broad enough to include any disputes arising out of the
employment relationship, including Title VII claims.87 Thus, parties
must be specific when providing for arbitration of wrongful termina-
tion claims, and excluding statutory claims.
78. Walker, 385 U.S. at 197.
79. See Walker, 385 U.S. 196 (subjecting fireman to Railway Labor Act compelling
arbitration for minor disputes was not voluntarily entered into; matters involving
federal acts are outside the scope of this article due to their complexity; however, it is
noteworthy to see the United States Supreme Court's treatment of involuntarily
entered agreements to arbitrate).
80. See Walker, 385 U.S. 196.
81. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000);
Arakawa v. Japan NetworkGroup, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
82. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694.
83. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692 (quoting Kinney v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc.,
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1999)).
84. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692.
85. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
86. See Arakawa, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349.
87. Id.
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IV. ARBITRATION EXPENSES IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE SETTING
With the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Circuit
City making arbitration applicable to many new contexts, the issue of
fee-splitting is a growing concern.88 United States Circuit Courts are
split in their treatment of this issue and the United States Supreme
Court has yet to take a stand on the issue.8 9 The circuit courts have
taken four different approaches in apportioning expenses and fees
between the parties: a per se rule against fee splitting, a provision
requiring costs unique to arbitration to be paid by the employer, a rule
splitting fees between the parties, and a case-by-case analysis to deter-
mine a party's ability to bear the burden of costs.90 The basic rationale
behind a per se rule against fee-splitting is that "plaintiffs should not
be required to pay more than if they had proceeded to court and
should not have to pay part of the arbitrators' fees any more than they
would have paid a fee to a judge."9' The justification for requiring an
employee to pay only administrative costs is that an employee should
solely bear the expenses one would have to pay if the action were
brought in court.92 Some courts have reasoned that because arbitra-
tion overall is usually less expensive than litigation, fee-splitting is
acceptable so long as the fees do not make the forum inaccessible for
plaintiffs. 93 And finally, other courts have taken a case-by-case
approach, looking at the claimant's particular circumstances in deter-
mining the claimant's ability to pay.94 Nevertheless, the primary areas
for concern in apportioning costs are the payment of arbitrators' fees,
filing and administrative fees, and travel expenses for parties and for
arbitrators.
95
88. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (cautioning that "courts should remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
contract"'); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (hinting that
broad per se ban on fee-splitting may not be proper).
90. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See
Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669; Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir.
1999); Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.
91. Courts Split on Requiring Employees to Pay Fees in Mandatory Arbitrations (U.S.
Law Week, Washington, D.C.), April 3, 2001, at 2587.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Bradford, 238
F.3d 549.
95. Other fees, such as witness and attorney fees and room rentals, are outside the
scope of this article, which focuses on what courts believe to be primary areas of
concern.
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A. Arbitrator's Fees
Arbitrator's fees vary based upon the expertise of the arbitrator
and the number of arbitrators on the panel.96 However, per diem arbi-
trator fees are generally steep, ranging from $125 per hour to $600 per
hour to resolve a claim. 97 Thus, with an average employer-employee
claim lasting up to forty hours, the parties would incur between
$3,750 and $14,000 just for the arbitrator's fee.98
Many employment contracts require an employee to pay one-half,
or sometimes all, of the arbitrator's fees.99 Some courts take the posi-
tion that a plaintiff "should not have to pay part of the arbitrators' fees
any more than they would have paid a fee to a judge."' 00 In Cole v.
Burns International Security Services, the United States Court of Appeal
for the District of Columbia Circuit maintained that a former employer
could not require an employee to pay for all or part of the arbitrator's
fees. 101 The court relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation in which the
Court observed that employers in the securities industry routinely pay
all of the arbitrator's fees.'0 2 The D.C. Circuit concluded that "there is
no reason to think that the [United States Supreme] Court would have
approved a program of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in
Gilmer in the absence of employer agreement to pay arbitrators'
fees." 10 3 The circuit court went even further, declaring that an
"employee can never be required, as a condition of employment, to pay
an arbitrator's compensation in order to secure the resolution of statu-
tory claims . .. (any more than an employee can be made to pay a
judge's salary)."1 0 4 Thus, the court concluded that a per se ban is
needed to prevent "de facto forfeiture of the employee's statutory
rights."10
5
96. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules) (effectiveJan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109 (AAA's default provision
provides the appointment of one arbitrator).
97. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557; see Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230 (10th Cir. 1999). Per hour fees based on eight hour work day.
98. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477; see Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230.
99. See Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230.
100. Courts Split on Requiring Employees to Pay Fees in Mandatory Arbitrations (U.S.
Law Week, Washington, D.C.), April 3, 2001, at 2587.
101. See Cole, 105 F.3d 1465.
102. Id.; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (court did not specifically address fee-
splitting).
103. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Other courts have applied a per se ban if the mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement is entered into as a condition of continued employ-
ment, holding that requiring an employee to pay even a portion of the
arbitrator's fees is unenforceable. 10 6 In one case, the agreement man-
dated the employee (a janitor) pay for one-half of the arbitrator's
fees. 107 Such an agreement puts the employee "between the proverbial
rock and a hard place-it prohibit[s] use of the judicial forum, where a
litigant is not required to pay for a judge's services, and the prohibitive
cost substantially limited use of the arbitral forum."' 018 Hence, the
employee had no reasonable access to a forum for resolving claims.
Even arbitration governed by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) provides no relief as the rules require each party to pay one-half
of the arbitrator's fees unless otherwise agreed, giving no indication of
apportioning, reducing, or waiving arbitrator's fees which are usually
the most expensive cost of arbitration, on average costing $700 per
day.'0 9 Those courts that have suggested the apportionment of costs
at the end of arbitration neglect to take into account the substantial
monetary risk a claimant must assume, potentially discouraging meri-
torious claims.110
Another approach advocated in dealing with arbitrators' fees,
applied in the First Circuit, permits fee-splitting between parties."' In
one case, an agreement was enforceable notwithstanding the employee
paying up to $3000 per day so long as the amount assessed was
reviewable by a court for unreasonableness." 2 The court pointed to
the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corporation that parties trade the courtroom for the sim-
plicity of arbitration which is "far more affordable ... than is pursuing
a claim in court.""' 1 3
The Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc. held
that a claimant can be required to pay up to half of the forum fees for
compulsory arbitration so long as the payment does not violate public
policy by precluding access to an adequate substitute to a judicial
106. See Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1235.
109. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules) (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109; Cole, 105 F.3d 1465
(quoting Kenneth May, Labor Lawyers at ABA Session Debate Role of Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at A-12 (Feb. 15, 1996)).
110. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
111. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 16.
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forum for protecting the claimant's rights. 114 The Fifth Circuit inter-
preted Gilmer as not imposing a per se ban on fee-splitting; Gilmer
only "indicates that an arbitral cost allocation scheme may not be used
to prevent effective vindication of federal statutory claims."' 15 In Wil-
liams, no evidence existed that the prospect of incurring arbitrator fees
hampered or discouraged the employee in bringing the claim. 1 6 Thus,
fee-splitting of the arbitrator's costs by itself does not necessarily
render an arbitration provision unenforceable." 7
Courts that have adopted a case-by-case approach have hinted that
a broad per se ban against fee-splitting may not be proper. 1 8 The
United States Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
v. Randolph addressed the issue of whether the possibility of splitting
an arbitrator's fee precluded a litigant from effectively vindicating fed-
eral statutory rights in the arbitral forum, looking specifically at the
individual's ability to pay. 1 9 The Court concluded that an arbitration
agreement that does not mention allocation of the arbitrator's fee is
not per se unenforceable because of the risk that the claimant will be
required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs. 120 The claimant has the
"burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.' 1 2 1 One
court elaborated on the Supreme Court's holding by stating:
[The Supreme Court's] refusal to accept the speculative risk that a
claimant might incur prohibitive costs undermines the rationale of
those courts that would impose a per se prohibition against an arbitra-
tion provision that might impose prohibitive costs against an individ-
ual on the theory that any such risk of prohibitive costs, even if that
risk is entirely uncertain, surely deters the bringing of arbitration. 122
The Fourth Circuit in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems,
Inc., relying on the decision in Green Tree, explained that although "fee
splitting can render an arbitration agreement unenforceable where the
arbitration fees ... are so prohibitive as to effectively deny the [claim-
ant] access to the arbitral forum," a case-by-case analysis should be
performed, focusing on the claimant's ability to pay the arbitrator's
fees. 1 2 3 The Bradford court construed Gilmer and Williams as also
114. See Williams, 197 F.3d 752.
115. Id.; see Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
116. See Williams, 197 F.3d 752.
117. Id.
118. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79; Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.
119. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 92.
122. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557.
123. Id. at 554.
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focusing on the particular individual involved and "whether the partic-
ular claimant has a full and fair opportunity to vindicate ... statutory
claims"-essentially a "case-by-case analysis that focuses ... upon the
claimant's ability to pay . . . , the expected cost differential between
arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is
so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.' 1 24 Thus, the "proper
inquiry under Gilmer [and Green Tree] is not where the money goes
but rather the amount of money that ultimately will be paid by the
claimant," for a claimant cannot be deterred from vindicating statutory
rights "simply by the fact that [the] fees would be paid to the arbitrator
where the overall cost of arbitration is otherwise equal to or less than
the cost of litigation in court.
125
B. Filing and Administrative Fees
A major cost component of arbitration is the filing and adminis-
trative fees. 1 2 6 The AAA's requirements provide a typical representa-
tion of standard fees which the parties have to pay. 127 In addition to
the arbitrator's fees, the AAA requires a nonrefundable filing fee of
$500 for claims under $10,000 and a $2,000 filing fee for claims not
seeking a specific amount of damages. 128 The filing fee must be
advanced by the initiating party, "subject to final apportionment by the
arbitrator in the award"; in cases before three or more arbitrators, a
nonrefundable filing fee of $1,500 is required. 129 Moreover, a $150
per diem hearing fee is assessed to each party; in cases before three or
more arbitrators, a $250 per diem hearing fee is assessed. 130 The rules
also provide for stiff postponement and cancellation penalties and an
advanced deposit for any fees that the AAA deems necessary.' 3' The
AAA does "defer or reduce the administrative fees" due to "extreme
hardship." 132 Nevertheless, the AAA Rules give no indication of
apportioning, reducing, or waiving other costs, such as renting a room
124. Id. at 555-556.
125. Id. at 556.
126. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules) (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109.
127. Id.
128. Id.; Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998).
129. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules), Rule 38 (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; Cole, 105 F.3d 1465 (quoting Kenneth May, Labor Lawyers at ABA Session
Debate Role of Am. Arbitration Ass'n, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at A-12 (Feb. 15,
1996)).
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and expense of witnesses. 133 Thus, those courts that have suggested
the apportionment of costs at the end of arbitration neglect to take into
account the substantial monetary risk a claimant must assume, and
the potential of discouraging meritorious claims. 1
34
As with the apportionment of arbitrator's fees, courts are split in
their treatment of filing and administrative fees. The Eleventh Circuit
found that when an employee is vulnerable to steep filing fees, fee-
splitting provisions rendered arbitration agreements unenforceable
because the high costs deprive "an employee of any hope of meaning-
ful relief."'135 The court held that the "arbitrability of . . . claims rests
on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent
to court remedies ... [However], when an arbitration clause has provi-
sions that defeat the remedial purpose of [a] statute,.., the arbitration
clause is not enforceable.' 1 36 Other courts mandate that employees
pay solely administrative costs since the employee would have to bear
those if the action were brought in court.137
Another approach compels the employer to bear all costs unique
to arbitration.' 38 One court stated that it is not a sufficient response
that an employee may have the costs reduced after judicial review,
because substantial costs "still pose[ ] a significant risk that employees
will have to bear large costs to vindicate their statutory right . . . and
therefore chill[ ] the exercise of that right."'139 While the cost of arbi-
tration is, "on average smaller than [that] of litigation, it is also true
that the amount awarded is on average smaller as well .... The pay-
ment of large, fixed, forum costs, especially in the face of expected
meager awards, serves as a significant deterrent."' 40 Thus, the "arbi-
tration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the
employee to bear any type of expenses that the employee would not be
133. Id.; Cole, 105 F.3d 1465 (quoting Kenneth May, Labor Lawyers at ABA Session
Debate Role of Am. Arbitration Ass'n, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at A-12 (Feb. 15,
1996)).
134. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
135. Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (subjecting employee to an administrative filing fee
of $2000).
136. Id.
137. Courts Split on Requiring Employees to Pay Fees in Mandatory Arbitrations (U.S.
Law Week, Washington, D.C.), April 3, 2001, at 2587.
138. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
139. Id. at 687; see also Arakawa, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349 (holding that the mere
possibility that plaintiff might be compelled to pay a portion of arbitration costs did
not preclude arbitration unless fees were so great and employee's financial situation
was such that imposition would make the employee unable to enforce his rights or
would substantially deter the employee from seeking to enforce his rights).
140. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 688.
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required to bear if [the employee] were free to bring the action in
court."' 41
The United States Supreme Court has provided little guidance but
does explain that the mere risk of incurring prohibitively high costs,
including filing and administrative fees, is not sufficient to invalidate
an otherwise valid arbitration provision. 142 The party opposing arbi-
tration must show the likelihood of being saddled with deterrently
high costs. 143 However, exactly how much proof a court should
demand prior to invaliding an arbitration provision is not yet clear. 144
C. Travel Expenses
According to the AAA, an employment contract may designate the
location of the arbitration. 145 However, if the parties do not establish a
place for the arbitration, either party may request a specific location
prior to the appointment of the arbitrator. 146 In the absence of a
timely objection, the request will be granted; if the other party objects
to the location, the AAA has the power to determine the location,
which is final and binding.' 47 If a request for a location is submitted
after the appointment of an arbitrator, the arbitrator will decide all
location disputes. 48
When the employment contract does not designate a location, the
AAA's procedure for selecting a location does not present any special
problems when the employer and employee are located in the same city
or state, since presumably, both parties will request arbitration to take
place near the employment setting.' 49 However, difficulties arise when
an employee works for a national employer, headquartered in another
state. Customarily, the employer will outline in the employment con-
tract that arbitration is to take place in the state where the national
headquarters are located. Such a provision can impose a severe hard-
ship on the employee, who may have to travel long distances for resolu-
tion of a dispute. Adding yet another burden, the AAA directs that the
arbitrator's travel expenses are to shared equally by the parties, unless
the employment contract provides differently or the arbitrator directs
141. Id. at 687.
142. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules), Rule 38 (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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otherwise, making an employee responsible for even greater expenses
if the arbitrator is also from another state.'15  Many arbitration provi-
sions in employment contracts do specify how fees, including travel
expenses, are to be apportioned between parties.1 5 1 However, these
provisions are sometimes unenforceable because they "circumscribe[ ]
the arbitrator's authority to grant effective relief by mandating equal
sharing of fees and costs of arbitration despite the award of fees per-
mitted a prevailing party . . ." in some circumstances. 15 2
Travel expenses also effect the production of witnesses. For
instance, the AAA provides that any travel expenses for witnesses are
to be borne equally by both parties, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties or otherwise awarded by the arbitrator. 153 When a party
requires the production of witnesses, having them travel across several
states is usually not feasible. This is especially true for the employee's
witnesses, because employees would choose, in many instances, to
forego the calling of some witnesses in lieu of fronting expensive travel
costs and awaiting apportionment of travel expenses at the end of arbi-
tration. The employer, on the other hand, usually has more than suffi-
cient funds to advance the costs of travel and has easier access to
witnesses as most will be the company's employees. Consequently,
unless otherwise agreed, if an employer calls numerous witnesses, the
employee will be assessed for one-half of the opposing party's presen-
tation of witnesses. 1
5 4
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR ENSURING A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE FORUM
The goal of arbitration is the final disposition of disputes between
employers and employees in a faster, less expensive, more expeditious,
and typically less formal manner than is available in ordinary judicial
proceedings. 155 Thus, the primary purpose of arbitration is to provide
a reasonable alternative to a judicial forum. 1 56
150. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules) (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109.
151. See generally, Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.
2001).
152. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1285 (applying specifically to Title VII claims).
153. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation &
Arbitration Rules) (effective Jan. 1, 1999), 1998 WL 1527109.
154. See id.
155. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628; Judith A. La Manna, Mediation Can Help
Parties Reach Faster, Less Costly Results in Civil Litigation, 73 N.Y. St. B.J. 10 (2001).
156. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484 n.15 (using the phrase "arbitrators' fees" to include the
"arbitrator's expenses and any other costs associated with the arbitrator's services.").
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While the rationale behind arbitration of disputes is commenda-
ble, arbitration should not be encouraged if it is used for the detriment
of either the employer or the employee. Typically, though, the
employer has the advantage, offering employees contracts on a "take-it-
or-leave-it" basis allowing employers to structure arbitration agree-
ments that "systematically disadvantage employees." 157 It is unlikely
that an employee would voluntarily submit a claim to arbitration, with
arbitrators' fees costing up to $1,000 per day, unless mandated by the
employer as a condition of employment.'15 Absent the arbitration pro-
vision, the employee would be free to pursue claims in court. 159
Fee-splitting provisions, which are common in most employment
contracts, potentially operate as a disincentive to the submission of
meritorious claims to arbitration.160 Even those courts that have sug-
gested the apportionment of costs at the end of arbitration neglect to
take into account the substantial monetary risks a claimant must
assume, disadvantaging those employees with less than sufficient
means. 161
Therefore, a per se ban of fee-splitting is needed. An arbitration
clause requiring an employer to pay all arbitration costs seems to be in
accord with the goal of arbitration: encouragement of employees' vindi-
cation of claims in an alternative forum. 1 62 Indeed, by dictating arbi-
tration, the employer has already chosen to avoid the substantial risk
of a jury trial, benefiting from arbitration's traditionally smaller
awards. 163 Moreover, preventing employees who are seeking to vindi-
cate their rights from gaining access to a judicial forum and then
requiring them to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they would
never be required to pay for a judge in court, seems to undermine Con-
gress' intent of providing a reasonable alternative forum and not dis-
couraging employee claims.' 64 Never in the history of American
jurisprudence has a beneficiary of a federal statute been required to
pay for a judge.'6 5
157. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
161. Id; see, e.g., Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230.
162. Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
163. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
164. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484; see Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.
165. See Cole, 105 F.3d 1465.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The 2001 United States Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City
expanded the application of the Federal Arbitration Act to all arbitra-
tion agreements involving interstate commerce, save employment con-
tracts of transportation workers, and clarified when the FAA should be
applied. 166 Prior to Circuit City, the circuit courts were split in their
approach to arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce.167
With arbitration becoming more common in employment con-
tracts, and given the recent holding in Circuit City, determining who
should bear the burden of arbitration fees is essential.168 While some
courts contend that the splitting of arbitration fees is lawful, many
employees will be prevented from bringing claims due to prohibitively
high forum costs. Consequently, the employment contract should
require the employer to pay all fees and costs associated with arbitra-
tion to ensure that no meritorious claim is deterred.' 69 The employ-
ment contract is, after all, customarily solely an employer creation,
with the employer precluding employee access to a judicial forum.
Arbitration does produce efficiency along with creating burdens
for litigants. 7 ' Arbitral litigants often lack traditional "discovery, evi-
dentiary rules, a jury, and any meaningful right to further review." 171
Nevertheless, in "light of a strong federal policy favoring arbitration,
these inherent weaknesses should not make an arbitration clause
unenforceable."1 72  Yet, when an arbitration clause "deprives an
employee of any hope of meaningful relief, while imposing high costs
on the employee," the purpose behind the FAA is undermined, thus
reconfirming the need for a per se ban of employee payment of arbitra-
tion fees, fulfilling Congress' intent of providing a reasonable alterna-
tive forum for dispute resolution. 173
Melissa G. Lamm
166. See Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105.
167. Id.; see supra note 19.
168. Id.; see supra note 19.
169. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
170. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217; see Paladino, 134 F.3d 1054.
171. Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062.
172. Id.
173. Id.; Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484. See Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.
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